LIP47: Modify the "Dynamic Threshold" Value in the LIP0 Proposal

Title: LIP47: Modify the "Dynamic Threshold" Value in the LIP0 Proposal Authors: Yuxing Date Created: 2023.05.08 Forum Link: https://forum.lxdao.io/t/lip0/1617

TL;DR

This proposal will make necessary corrections to the voting rules defined by the LIP0 proposal based on actual needs (low voting rates that harm the efficiency of daily operations).

Background

As of the date of the proposal, LXDAO has a total of 76 Buidler Card holders, and the overall voting rate has been consistently maintained at 20%-30%. In terms of the number of participants, it can meet the requirement of a minimum absolute number of affirmative votes ≥ 20% for ordinary proposals most of the time, but it is far below the consensus-level voting requirement of 70%.

However, please note that this voting rate is the result of multiple urgings from various parties. The active votes cast autonomously are about 10%. The governance group has conducted a detailed analysis of the reasons for this phenomenon, ideal solutions, and actual limitations, which can be viewed here;

The current low rate of active votes has actually hindered the normal operation of LXDAO. At the same time, educational governance improvement measures require a substantial investment of resources, which is not an appropriate choice at the moment. This proposal suggests transferring the decision-making power for routine matters from collective voting to fixed post members of each group,

To prioritize the guarantee of daily operations.

Description

Lower the calculation parameters of the "dynamic threshold"

The voting rules defined by the LIP0 proposal:

Before the issuance of the governance token $LX, only the Buidler Card can serve as the voting right.

Voting is based on a dynamic threshold method, with the base number for the threshold calculation being the total number of Builder Card holders.

An ordinary proposal is passed with a minimum absolute number of affirmative votes ≥ 20%. (Consensus-level proposals require ≥70%)

Note:

Absolute affirmative votes = number of affirmative votes - number of negative votes. For example, if there are 30 affirmative votes and 20 negative votes, the absolute affirmative votes = 10 votes

Negative votes include both negative votes and abstentions. Modified to:

Before the issuance of the governance token $LX, only the Buidler Card can serve as the voting right.

Voting is based on a dynamic threshold method.

An ordinary proposal is passed with a minimum absolute number of affirmative votes ≥ 10%. (Consensus-level proposals require ≥40%)

Note:

Absolute affirmative votes = number of affirmative votes - (negative votes x 2 + abstentions). For example, if there are 30 affirmative votes, 20 negative votes, and 2 abstentions, the absolute affirmative votes = -12 votes

The 20% value in the LIP0 proposal comes from two sources: 1. We set a maximum negative vote ratio of 40% (meaning if the negative votes exceed 40%, the proposal cannot pass), which is a healthy range; the second source is that the average participation rate in DAO organization governance is about 20%, and the data source is here; considering both, 20% of the absolute affirmative votes are obtained.

Through charts, we can more intuitively compare the differences between the two proposals:

LIP0: Votes are invalid until affirmative votes reach 20% of the total votes; once the total votes exceed 20%, the proposal is approved if the absolute number of affirmative votes is greater than 20%, otherwise it is vetoed; the proposal is vetoed if the number of negative votes exceeds 40%, and the proposal is approved if the number of affirmative votes exceeds 60%.

New Proposal: Votes are invalid until affirmative votes reach 10% of the total votes; once the total votes exceed 10%, the proposal is approved if the absolute number of affirmative votes is greater than 10%, otherwise it is vetoed; the proposal is vetoed if the number of negative votes exceeds 30%, and the proposal is approved if the number of affirmative votes exceeds 70%.

Compared to the LIP0 proposal, both plans have the same passing rate before the affirmative votes constitute 10% of the total votes; within the range of 10% to 30% of the total votes, the new proposal has a higher passing rate, while above 30%, the passing rate of the new proposal is lower than that of LIP0.

Looking at the current situation of LXDAO: currently, with 30% of the votes, only 10% are actively voted (estimated by core members), and the remaining 20% are the result of urging. Most proposals have been thoroughly discussed by the 10% active voters before the vote, and the rest of the voters are unlikely to cast negative votes. It can be understood that within the 10% to 30% range, the new proposal does not actually reduce the degree of decentralization, but achieves rapid governance while maintaining the original degree; when a proposal is highly controversial and the affirmative votes exceed 30% of the total votes, it requires a stronger consensus than LIP0.

It should be emphasized that:

1. This is a proposal that prioritizes feasibility under the constraints of actual conditions (time, manpower, finances).

   The current paradoxical situation of LXDAO requires optimizing governance to improve voting participation efficiency - optimizing governance requires efficient voting on proposals. Before this proposal, there were two more comprehensive proposals, namely: 1) Dividing the Builder into voting rights and proposal rights; 2) Dividing the voting rights into affirmative votes and negative votes, and using them in combination.

   After verification, the governance group unanimously believes that it is not suitable to invest too many resources (modifying contracts, getting familiar with new rules) at this stage to build an ideal voting procedure and to delay the main goal of the current stage: growth. A proposal with low execution cost should be adopted to prioritize the efficiency of proposal voting.

2. This proposal is only the first step in the entire governance optimization.

   As mentioned above, we need to first break the paradoxical situation, provide operational efficiency, and then, in conjunction with the main goal - growth, gradually optimize various governance measures, such as governance incentives, dimensionality reduction of proposal information, automated proposal notifications, etc., for more details, please refer here.

Budgets and Distribution

This proposal does not require additional expenditure, and the contribution rewards resulting from this proposal will be borne by the governance group.

Key Result

The organizational action efficiency is greatly improved, providing a foundation for the optimization of more governance measures.

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TL;DR

此提案将对LIP0提案所定义的投票规则做出基于实际需要（投票率过低伤害日常运作效率）的修正。

Background

截止至提案日，LXDAO共有76位Buidler Card 持有者，整体投票率长期保持在20%-30%， 从参与人数看，绝大多数时候，可以满足普通提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 20% 的要求，但远低于共识级投票70%的要求。

但请注意，这个投票率是多方多次催促下的结果，自主投出的积极票大概在10%，对此现象出现的原因、理想化的解决方案、实际限制，治理组进行了详尽分析，可在这里查看。

目前过低的积极票已实际妨碍到 LXDAO 的正常运作，同时教育性的治理提高措施需要较多资源的投入，不是当下适宜的选择，此提案提议将日常性事物的决策权从集体投票转交由各小组固定岗成员，

以优先保证日常运作。

Description

降低“动态阈值”的计算参数

将LIP0定义的投票规则：

• 在治理代币 $LX 发行前，仅 Buidler Card 可以作为投票权。
• 计票采取动态阈值的方式，阈值计算基数=Buidler Card持有总数。
• 普通级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 20% 即为通过。（共识级提案需≥70%）

注：

1. 绝对赞成票 = 赞成票 - 反对票。例如，30 票赞成，20 票反对，弃权，绝对赞成票 = 10 票
2. 反对票包括反对票和弃权票。

修改为：

• 在治理代币 $LX 发行前，仅 Buidler Card 可以作为投票权。
• 计票采取动态阈值的方式。
• 普通级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 10% 即为通过。（共识级提案需≥40%）

注：

1. 绝对赞成票 = 赞成票 - （反对票 X 2+弃权票）。例如，30 票赞成，20 票反对，2弃权，绝对赞成票 = -12 票

LIP0提案是中的20%得取值来源有 2 个，1、是我们设定40%最高反对票比例（既反对票高于40%则提案无法通过），是一个健康范围；第二个， DAO 组织治理参与率平均在20%，数据源在这里；综合考虑取得20%的绝对赞成票数。

通过图表，我们可以更加直观对比两种方案的不同：

LIP0：赞成票达到总票数的20%之前无效；总票数大于20%后，绝对赞成票需大于20% 则通过，反之则否决；反对票大于40%时提案否决/赞成票大于60%时提案通过。

新方案：赞成票达到总票数的10%之前无效；总票数大于10%后，绝对赞成票需大于10% 则通过，反之则否决；反对票大于30%时提案否决/赞成票大于70%时提案通过。

相比于LIP0方案，在赞成票占总票数的10%之前，两个方案通过率一致；在赞成票占总票数的10%-30%区间，新方案有着更高的通过率，而30%以上，新方案通过率低于LIP0。

从LXDAO的现状来看：目前30%的投票数中，只有10%的主动投票者（核心成员预估），其余20%则是催促的结果，大多数提案在投票之前已经经过10%的主动投票者充分论证过，其余投票者基本不会投反对票，可以理解为，在10%-30%区间内，新提案实际上并不降低去中心化程度，而是在保持原有程度的基础上，实现快速治理；而当一份提案争议很大，赞成票大于总票数的30%以上时，则比LIP0要求更强的共识。

需要强调的是：

1、这是一份在现实条件限制（时间、人力、财务）下的，优先考虑可执行性的提案。

LXDAO面临悖论的现状，需要优化治理提高投票参与效率——优化治理需要对提案进行有效率的表决，此提案前有两份较为完善的提案，分别是：将buidler 分为投票权和提案权/ 将投票权分为赞成票和反对票，组合使用；

经论证，治理组一致意见是：现阶段不适合投入过多资源（修改合约、熟悉新规则），去构建一个理想的投票程序，并为此耽误现阶段的主要目标：增长，应采取一个执行成本低的提案，优先保证提案的表决的效率。

2、此提案只是整个治理优化的第一步。

如上述所说，我们需要先打破悖论的现状，提供运行的效率，而后配合主目标-增长，逐步对各项治理措施实施优化，如治理激励、提案信息量降维、提案通知自动化等，详细内容可见这里。

Budgets And Distribution

此提案不需要额外申请支出，由治理小组承担因此次提案而产生的贡献奖励

Key result

组织行动效率大幅度提升，为更多治理措施的优化提供基础。