Authors: Lamentations, 0xMaha, Fry
Summary
This proposal makes reward distribution to L2s more efficient, and brings AURA LP incentives in house, by (i) near immediately distributing AURA pro-rata to the gauges voted on on the bi-weekly snapshot votes, (ii) reducing the baseline number of AURA that is minted per BAL for all LPs, and (iii) favouring distributions of AURA to more-aligned parties more likely to participate in Aura governance.
Background
Aura currently emits AURA rewards indiscriminately towards all Balancer LPs that use the Aura protocol. In exchange, Aura DAO directs a share of the BAL earned by these LPs toward Aura stakeholders. This has allowed Aura to represent a large share of Balancer mainnet TVL, along with over 60% of all BAL emissions.
The current system allows Balancer stakeholders that are not aligned with Aura DAO to acquire large amounts of AURA, without providing direct value to the protocol. An opportunity now exists to optimize AURA distribution in order to entice users to increase vlAURA accumulation and spend on voting incentives, increasing participation in the Aura DAO and the governance utility of AURA itself.
Even with the current fee take, LPs on Aura earn 1.5-to-2 times the amount of incentives LPs on Balancer earn.
Aura DAO can vote to reduce the AURA minted per BAL earned for all pools, resulting in a significant decrease in new AURA float. To compensate for this reduction in emissions, Aura DAO can leverage the AURA allocated to the treasury and direct it to pools pro-rata based on their share of vlAURA gauge weight each voting cycle.
In tandem, these two changes will have the effect of:
This model is predicated on the assumption that Aura will continue to boost a large share of Balancer liquidity into the future. In our opinion, this assumption is fair for the following reasons:
Terms
The two levers—a reduction multiplier on AURA minted and use of AURA to ‘boost’ vlAURA-aligned gauges—are flexible on what governance decides. Based on our analysis of the current yield landscape and factoring in Aura DAO’s needs, we believe this setup makes the most sense:
RewardMultiplier on all pools to 0.4, meaning a 60.0% reduction in baseline AURA mintedAssuming this passes in the forthcoming voting cycle, these changes would come into effect for the next vlAURA gauge voting round between Aug 17-21, with multipliers being changed on the 23th and AURA distributions from the treasury from the 24th onward. This is in line with the existing Balancer epochs.
For clarity: the AURA minted against BAL on the auraBAL single-sided staking pool will not change.
Outcomes
This should resulting in the following changes per our estimations, assuming existing system parameters such as % of BAL earned by Aura:
Illustratively, this would have the following effect on pool yield as of numbers gathered in early July:
It is important to remember that under this proposed program, all LPs—even those in pools without vlAURA gauge weight—would still yield more than they would directly staking on Balancer.
Regarding use of treasury funds, the treasury will still have a large amount of AURA balance, especially factoring in the 1.5m AURA of protocol-owned liquidity in the 80/20 AURA/ETH Balancer pool that could be recovered by moving to a 50/50 pool.
Implementation
setRewardMultiplier on the Booster for all pools to update the reward multiplier from 1.0 to 0.40setVoteDelegate on the BoosterOwnerSecondary contract and set the voteDelegate to the newly deployed GaugeVoteRewards contract that will handle the pro rata AURA distributions by wrapping the call to vote_for_gauge_weightsGaugeVoteRewards is as follows:
setPoolIds with a start value of 0 and end value of Booster.poolLength()dstChainId to 110 for arbitrum gaugesdstChainId to 111 for optimism gaugesdstChainId to 109 for polygon gaugesBaseRewardPool.getRewards(holder, true)