This proposal appears on Balancer's forum.

Motivation

Almost four months ago, Balancer’s governance process was formally overhauled and handed off to the DAO through this proposal. Overall I would argue the revamp did increase the transparency and effectiveness of our governance process but some critical problems have become clear to me lately.

The ultimate authority of our governance process is BAL token holders. Currently, in order for a proposal to proceed for a vote it must have a majority of the Gov Council signal that the proposal has reached “soft consensus in the community”. Ballers and DAO contributors represent the majority of active community members. It’s not a stretch to imagine a scenario where large token holders support a proposal but the Ballers/active community do not. We have created a system where the Gov Council acts as gatekeepers with full control over what proceeds to a vote and what doesn’t.

Thus, I would make the argument that “soft consensus in the community” should NOT be a factor when considering a proposal to move forward to a vote. We must avoid the situation where core DAO contributors are against a proposal that has large token holder support, and that proposal does not proceed to a vote because it lacks “soft consensus in the community”.

Specification

The Gov Council will remain in place and their approval will still be required for a proposal to move to a vote. However, they will not vote on whether “soft consensus in the community” has been reached. Instead, the question will be “Is this a well defined proposal?”

What is the criteria for a “well defined” proposal?

• Includes a “Motivation”, “Specification”, and if applicable a “Risks” section
• If on-chain execution from the DAO Multisig is required, the “Specification” section must contain transaction details (address to send funds to, contract to interact with/function to call, etc)
• The intent of the proposal must be clear (not spam)
• BAL token holders must have the power to implement the proposal
  • Example: A proposal is made to deposit the FEI in our treasury into a new degen farm. As part of the subDAO formation proposal, the power to farm was delegated to the Treasury subDAO. BAL token holders cannot vote on how we farm with non-BAL treasury assets, so this proposal would not proceed to a vote. However, a proposal to remove the power to farm from the Treasury subDAO is within the scope of BAL token holders. If this proposal passes successfully, then the proposal to farm with FEI could go to a vote.
  • Example: A proposal is made to deploy Balancer to Optimism. Balancer Labs has sole discretion over core protocol development. BAL token holders do not have the power to compel Balancer Labs to act. It is solely the choice of Balancer Labs to create an official deployment of Balancer on Optimism, or not. Thus, this proposal would not proceed to a vote as BAL token holders lack the power to implement it.
  • Example: A proposal is made to deposit 100k BAL to Aave to earn a yield. BAL token holders have the power to allocate BAL held in the treasury, so as long as the other criteria for a “well defined” proposal are met, this would proceed to a vote.

If the Gov Council fails to execute their duties in good faith and votes against a “well defined” proposal proceeding to a vote, a proposal to replace the Gov Council with a different mechanism should be made ASAP.

Finally, this proposal would also implement a required minimum quorum of 100k BAL. Any snapshot vote that does not reach 100k total BAL voted AND at least 51% voting in favor would be considered to fail.