Authors: @danielmk, @0xDanko, @Xeonus, @mendesfabio, @Marcus
https://github.com/balancer/multisig-ops/pull/2742
This proposal restructures Balancer's operational model for long-term sustainability. It consolidates all operations under Balancer OpCo Limited as an agent of the DAO following the wind-down of Balancer Labs, right-sizes the team to 12.5 FTE, and establishes an annual operating budget of $1.9M, a 34% reduction from the ~$2.87M approved under BIP-873.
Combined with the companion [BIP-919] BAL Tokenomics Revamp (which proposes routing 100% of protocol fees to the DAO Treasury at an estimated ~$1.22M/year), this reduces the annual deficit from ~$2.6M to ~$700K and extends runway from under 4 years to ~9 years in the neutral scenario.
This BIP inherits the accountability framework introduced in BIP-873 while resetting every target to match the protocol's post-exploit reality.
[BIP-873] was approved in September 2025 with a budget of $2.87M USDC and 166,250 BAL until Q2 2026, setting DAO expenditure under $250K/month. It unified all service provider budgets under a single roadmap with five strategic pillars and measurable KPIs, built for a growth phase with a larger team and higher ambitions.
Two months after approval, the November 3rd exploit of Balancer V2 Composable Stable Pools, and the rough market conditions that followed, rendered the growth-phase KPIs unachievable. The reputational damage, TVL loss, and operational crisis response consumed Q4 2025 and early Q1 2026.
BIP-873's framework was sound in its unification of SPs and accountability structure, but the reality shifted. This proposal inherits that accountability DNA while resetting every target to match where the protocol is today.
Balancer Labs (BLabs) has ceased all operations, publicly announcing the decision to wind down citing risk exposure and the reality that the DAO model under the Foundation wrapper has evolved beyond the need for a BLabs entity overlapping it.
The clean separation between a deprecated BLabs entity and the operational DAO structure is protective: it isolates prior legal exposure from the ongoing protocol operations.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual operating budget | ~$2.87M (BIP-873 budget, excluding BLabs) |
| DAO revenue capture | ~$290K/year (17.5% of protocol fees) |
| Net annual deficit | ~$2.6M (current model) |
| BAL emissions (additional dilution) | |
| Entity complexity | Balancer Labs' mandates overlap with OpCo without clear DAO accountability |
The current model is not sustainable. Even with cost reductions, the current revenue split with veBAL and BAL emission schedule will deplete the Treasury in under 4 years with no path to self-sufficiency.
These problems predate the November exploit, but that tragic event removed the option of growing out of them. Balancer generated ~$1.32M in total fees over the last three months on a proven V3 architecture. The restructure focuses the team on revenue-generating products with demonstrated traction rather than speculative initiatives.
Balancer DAO operates through the following structure. The Foundation is not an independent actor: it is an agent of the DAO with no shareholders, and its Directors are legally bound to execute governance resolutions.
| Entity | Role |
|---|---|
| Balancer Foundation (KY) | Legal agent of the DAO. Parent company. Holds governance authority delegated by token holders. Directors legally bound to governance resolutions. No shareholders. |
| Balancer OpCo Ltd (BVI) | Child to Foundation. Primary Service Provider. Direct contractors consolidated (via COR) under this umbrella. Responsible for engineering, operations, BD, data, and communications. |
| Balancer Onchain (BVI) | Child to OpCo. Protocol operations entity (incorporated via BIP-863). Responsible for fee collection and other onchain operations. |
| Balancer Labs OÜ (Estonia) | Original founder entity. SC team, integrations and data. All operations ceased; essential staff contracted via OpCo. |
This covers all contributor compensation, service provider fees, infrastructure, and operational costs. It represents a ~34% reduction from the ~$2.87M approved under BIP-873 (which did not included BLabs expenses that were previously off-DAO budget).
Notes on reductions:
~12.5 FTE (including dedicated service providers)
The team is sized to maintain protocol security and performance while growing revenue-generating products within the operating budget. The restructure reduces headcount from approximately 25 to 12.5, retaining core expertise across smart contracts, SDK, frontend, API, product, BD, and operations.
The team concentrates resources on products with demonstrated or high-potential revenue. Everything else is deprioritized or deprecated.
| Product | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Boosted Pools | Core, Active | Growth. Flagship product. BPT looping strategies drive liquidity and volume. |
| reCLAMM | Core, Active development | Growth. Flagship product. Vulnerability fix required before relaunch. Possible rebranding. |
| LBPs | Opportunistic | UI delivery in progress. Actively marketed only when market conditions favor token launches. |
The team maintains V3 smart contracts, the frontend, backend, SDK, and integrations across active deployments. V2 moves to maintenance-only on a sunset path.
Beyond the core product scope, the team retains a mandate to explore new product opportunities as bandwidth allows and core KPIs are met. Current areas of interest include ETF-style structured products, yield-optimizer vaults, agent-based liquidity tooling, and improvements to boosted pool performance. These are not commitments; they are directions the lean team may pursue when the foundation is stable.
The protocol is currently deployed across 9+ chains on V2 and V3. Not all deployments generate meaningful revenue relative to their maintenance and operational cost. Active support is confirmed for four chains that produce meaningful volume and revenue: Ethereum, Gnosis, Arbitrum, and Base. All other chain deployments will undergo a thorough review based on fee performance, TVL, operational overhead, and strategic alignment. Chains that do not meet viability thresholds will be evaluated for sunset with reasonable notice to affected LPs and partners.
Growth is restructured from broad outreach to focused strategic engagement:
Self-service integration and ops tooling (such as Defilytica) will be integrated, built and maintained so smaller projects can deploy on Balancer without BD support. AI-assisted onboarding will be explored to reduce manual overhead.
The Balancer Foundation is, and remains, an agent of the DAO. It has no shareholders, and its Directors are legally bound to governance resolutions. The Foundation and its subsidiaries exist as legal wrappers to execute what governance decides. They do not set strategy independently.
With fewer service providers and a smaller team, a practical concern about centralization may be valid. This proposal addresses it through the following mechanisms:
Introduced by [BIP-882], the Treasury Council (TC) was created to ensure that within the corporate structure of the Balancer Foundation, the ecosystem interests are served and protected.
It also carries a great responsibility for being the signer set of the Treasury multisig (0x0EFcCBb9E2C09Ea29551879bd9Da32362b32fc89) The increased responsibility calls for a more internally aligned team of members to carry the main Treasury, holding all assets and DeFi strategies.
Additionally, the TC will now be responsible for channeling internal disputes and decision-making around the executive orders mandated by governance.
Current TC composition (threshold 5/7)
0x122AFb4667C5f80e45721a42C7c81e9140C62FA4)0xaa5af0dd9c52c773d36cdbc509a0b2a1ded4c196)0x606681E47afC7869482660eCD61bd45B53523D83)0x90347b9CC81a4a28aAc74E8B134040d5ce2eaB6D)0x11e450c72c2258ec792d5f64a263ecb18e8c0f06)0x512fce9B07Ce64590849115EE6B32fd40eC0f5F3)0xd17a9f089862351af82fa782435fac0f9e17786c)SwapOwner
0x512fce9B07Ce64590849115EE6B32fd40eC0f5F3) <> @Marcus (0xb7364Fca20EEC90f51b158C05199044AD362b675)0xd17a9f089862351af82fa782435fac0f9e17786c) <> @franzns (0xA574Af018138bBC2bf065f68015687Aa67388A2A)0x606681E47afC7869482660eCD61bd45B53523D83) <> @danielmk (0x7984aB7e6B51A50d970b74a437BC82156753b866)0x90347b9CC81a4a28aAc74E8B134040d5ce2eaB6D) <> @mendesfabio ( 0xF162D64Cab37fD3335122024f23680AF7cf067ad)The same can be said for the legal entities and their multisig, which carry great responsibility in the daily activities and operations (BIP-882), and with the DAO Directors seats being deprecated to reduce the Cayman/BVI corporate footprint, there's a need to replace them to add professional and backup signers, ratifying the swapping of Joshua Zimmer for @Lemma (as active signer); and @Xeonus for @Marcus (as backup). The 3/4 threshold remains unchanged, with Leeward (Director/Supervisor) and @0xDanko (Head of Operations) being the other two composing the 4-signer set.
SwapOwner
0x7019Be4E4eB74cA5F61224FeAf687d2b43998516) <> Marcus (0xb7364Fca20EEC90f51b158C05199044AD362b675)As we move forward to a vote, the community should weigh the following risks, which are here explained with how the proposal aims to mitigate them.
Team Morale and Retention
Risk: Restructuring from a larger team to 12.5 FTE is disruptive. Key contributors may choose to leave, and the transition period creates uncertainty. Mitigation: 45-day notice period for departing members. New BAL vesting for continuing contributors aligns long-term incentives. Clear role definitions and salary tiers remove ambiguity. The team members who continue are those who believe in the mission, were willing to take a salary cut and operate lean.
Operational Bottlenecks
Risk: A lean team covering engineering, operations, BD, data, and communications has minimal redundancy, slower execution on new features and fewer parallel workstreams. Loss of any key contributor creates risk. Mitigation: Cross-training across functions. Documentation of all critical processes.
Revenue Underperformance
Risk: If DAO fee revenue does not reach ~$1M/year under the new fee structure, the burn rate grows and runway shortens. Mitigation: Revenue sensitivity analysis (three scenarios: conservative, base, optimistic) is completed before vote. The 6-month review includes course correction. The Treasury (even post-buyback) provides a buffer in conservative scenarios.
Centralization Aspects
Risk: Fewer SPs and a smaller team may appear as centralization to the community, even if the legal framework remains DAO-governed. Mitigation: Mandatory quarterly transparency reports. Onchain treasury operations. Defined governance roles. 6-month revaluation. The restructured protocol actually requires fewer governance decisions (no gauge voting, no emission parameters), reducing the scope of centralized authority and power/influence.
Broader Community Perception
Risk: A headcount reduction may be perceived as a sign the protocol is failing, triggering LP exits and partner disengagement. Mitigation: The restructure is framed as a transition to sustainability which should be interpreted in conjunction with the companion tokenomics revamp proposal, demonstrating the full plan to self-sufficiency.
This operational proposal is the execution counterpart to the tokenomics restructure. The tokenomics BIP eliminates BAL emissions, restructures protocol fees (100% to DAO Treasury, V3 protocol share reduced to 25%), sunsets veBAL, and offers a BAL buyback. Those changes only make financial sense in the context of a lean operating model that can sustain itself during tough market conditions on ~$1.22M/year in fee revenue (premises and assumptions to different scenarios can be found here: source).
The team commits to implementing both proposals together. This linkage ensures the community is voting on specific KPIs and expected outcomes:
After community feedback and discussions, pre-snapshot:
Swap 4 signers on the TC multisig (0x0EFcCBb9E2C09Ea29551879bd9Da32362b32fc89, threshold 5/7) across 4 chains: Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon, Gnosis.
| Out | In | Old Address | New Address |
|---|---|---|---|
| solarcurve | Marcus | 0x512fce9B07Ce64590849115EE6B32fd40eC0f5F3 | 0xb7364Fca20EEC90f51b158C05199044AD362b675 |
| notsoformal | franzns | 0xd17a9f089862351af82fA782435faC0f9e17786c | 0xA574Af018138bBC2bf065f68015687Aa67388A2A |
| Mendesfabio (old | Mendesfabio (new) | 0x90347b9CC81a4a28aAc74E8B134040d5ce2eaB6D | 0xF162D64Cab37fD3335122024f23680AF7cf067ad |
| Danielmk (old) | Danielmk (new) | 0x606681E47afC7869482660eCD61bd45B53523D83 | 0x7984aB7e6B51A50d970b74a437BC82156753b866 |
Swap 1 signer on the Onchain Ltd multisig (0x16b0056636Fcc85f92C49cD49a24bc519d4A1941) across 15 chains: Ethereum, Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, Polygon, Gnosis, Avalanche, zkEVM, Mode, Fraxtal, HyperEVM, Plasma, Sonic, X Layer, Monad.
| Out | In | Old Address | New Address |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xeonus | Marcus | 0x7019Be4E4eB74cA5F61224FeAf687d2b43998516 | 0xb7364Fca20EEC90f51b158C05199044AD362b675 |
Swap 1 signer on the Directors multisig (0x3B8910F378034FD6E103Df958863e5c684072693) on Ethereum only. Threshold remains 3/4.
| Out | In | Old Address | New Address |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xeonus | Marcus | 0x7019Be4E4eB74cA5F61224FeAf687d2b43998516 | 0xb7364Fca20EEC90f51b158C05199044AD362b675 |
Transfer the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on the Balancer Authorizer contract from per-chain DAO multisigs to the unified Omni multisig. Each chain executes two transactions: (1) grantRole to Omni, then (2) revokeRole from the current DAO multisig.
| Chain | Authorizer | Current Admin (DAO Multisig) | New Admin (Omni) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrum | 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 | 0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0 | 0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e |
| Base | 0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a | 0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462 | 0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e |
| Gnosis | 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 | 0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18 | 0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e |
| Optimism | 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 | 0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc | 0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e |
| Avalanche | 0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6 | 0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3 | 0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e |
The Authorizer is the Balancer access control contract. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x00...00) is the root role that can grant and revoke all other roles. This enables all roles existing in the authorizer, including but not limited to the following operational capabilities:
| Capability | Description |
|---|---|
| Grant/revoke any role | Control who can call permissioned functions across the Vault, pool factories, gauges, and fee controllers |
| Swap fee management | Authorize addresses to set protocol-level and pool-level swap fees |
| Protocol fee collection | Authorize fee withdrawals and protocol fee parameter changes |
| Pause/unpause | Grant emergency pause authority on the Vault, usually to the Emergency subDAO multi-sig safes |
| Relayer management | Authorize/deauthorize relayers for the Vault |
| Factory permissions | Control which factories can register pools with the Vault |
Currently each L2 has its own DAO multisig holding admin privileges. This creates operational overhead as 5 separate multisigs need to coordinate for any cross-chain change. Transferring to the Omni multisig (0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e), which already exists on all these chains, consolidates L2 admin authority under a single signer set. This reduces coordination cost while the core team operates lean at 12.5 FTE. It follows the same principles of operation introduced for HyperEVM, XLayer and Monad chain (see BIP-862 for rationale).
Ethereum mainnet is not included in this admin transfer. The mainnet DAO multisig retains the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on the Ethereum Authorizer because it holds additional permissions that govern BAL token minting. Any changes to BAL supply or minting parameters must go through the DAO multisig and the formal governance process (BIP + vote). Separating BAL-related authority from core team operational control is an intentional safeguard.
However, for day-to-day operational permissions on mainnet such as factory registration, fee parameter changes, relayer management, and similar actions (i.e. the same scope that the Omni multisig handles on L2s), the DAO multisig can execute these directly without a formal BIP, as they fall within the core team's operational mandate defined in this proposal identical to L2s.