[BSP:01] Non-binding Signalling Proposal for Changing Reoccurring Compensation

TLDR: A proposal to signal how changes to reoccurring compensation for Core contributors should be agreed in the future. Should the Core retain broad discretion, or be required to detail their reasoning for changes to their compensation? And should a Compensation Committee be introduced for Cowmoonity scrutiny, or even to lead the process?

Context:

Currently, the Core retains broad discretion to assess appropriate compensation for its regular contributors, and those decisions are ratified by regular governance proposals. This is effective, as members of the Core (who are specialists in their own fields) can point to industry standards, competitive rates and their personal circumstances as criteria for compensation. Broad discretion also avoids lots of administration, so is cheap and time-efficient.

However, broad discretion raises concerns where compensation changes significantly without explanation or oversight. To address this, this proposal suggests two simple kinds of change that could be implemented to improve the situation simply and effectively:

(1) Publish Reasoning – for every change in a contributor’s reoccurring pay, the compensation proposal could explain briefly why the change for that contributor is needed (e.g. inflationary, in line with market, to meet X’s needs in order to retain them); and/or

(2) Cowmoonity Oversight – we could establish a Compensation Committee, to be populated by 3 elected DAO members who are not in the Core. The Committee would review each change and provide their thoughts and reasoning as to whether the change is justified. Final say on the changes included in the proposal could sit with the Core, or could be moved to the Committee.

Both of these options might aid our transparency and scrutiny for compensation decisions. However, each also adds additional burdens, including taking time away from the Core that may otherwise be used to benefit the DAO, or devoting resources to a new Committee who would likely need to be compensated for their work.

Options:

The balance between transparency and efficiency is complicated, and so members may feel that a blend of these options will be most effective. As such, this proposal suggests 4 options for balancing the two changes describe above. The below table illustrates their differences:

Option 1 calls for the Core to retain its broad discretion over compensation amounts.

Option 2 calls for the Core to provide a brief explanation for every change in any Core contributor's reoccurring pay, but would not involve any Cowmoonity oversight.

Option 3 calls for the Core to provide the same reasons as Option 2, but to a new Compensation Committee, together with any other details requested by the Committee (e.g. competitive salaries elsewhere). The Committee would review the position, and submit their own view on each change together with their reasoning. Both sets of reasons would be published to the DAO. However, the Core would retain discretion over the changes submitted in the final proposal.

Option 4 is the same as Option 3, but would deprive the Core of their right to decide on the final proposed changes, instead allowing the Committee to submit the changes that they think are most appropriate. All Core reoccurring payment proposals would be made by the Committee.

Limitations:

This proposal does not outline a grand vision for the long term future of Beefy’s compensation structure. As Beefy grows to become larger and more sophisticated, our approach must also evolve. In the long term, we might expect compensation issues to be tied up with other matters, such as on the decentralisation/autonomy of our teams, delegation of authority and scrutiny across the DAO.

Instead, this proposal recognises that the current system is not broken and doesn’t need fixing. It seeks only to gauge sentiment on possible changes in pursuit of continuous improvement. As such, we ask that voters do not view their decision as deciding the ultimate fate of compensation at Beefy, but rather as a statement of their opinion on which if any of the proposed changes may help.

Signalling Proposals

This proposal also introduces a new type of Beefy governance proposal – a “Beefy Signaling Proposal” (BSP). BSPs are non-binding proposals intended to signal the Cowmoonity’s feelings and intentions on the issue being raised, without tying the DAO to the outcome. This allows members to express their views honestly, without concern for tactical voting or the practicalities of implementation.

In theory, a clear outcome in favour of change should be a strong signal to the Core to pursue the change independently. Where the Core refuses or fails to deliver on that signal, a binding Beefy Improvement Proposal can be used instead. Alternatively, a strong signal against proposed changes should quieten pressure for those changes amongst the Cowmoonity, at least for the near future.

Note: voting for this proposal is weighted, to allow members to express varying degrees of preference for a number of options.

Proposal:

Which approach should Beefy implement for decisions about changes to compensation for Core contributors?