Governance Notes:

• This is the third edition of this proposal, and it is approved by the author.
• Due to limitation of Snapshot, data section of this proposal is not available here but it can be found in Governance Forum.

Author

Lyule67.ETH

Proposal

The statement has been made “if you want an unlock, refund all the rewards.”

Below, you will find math showing proportionate calculations outlining how many rewards the current and proposed-to-be-unlocked-TVL received.

Additionally, you will find the grand total of all rewards ever given.

The “Respective Percentage” or “RP” was calculated by comparing the (current) proposed-to-be-unlocked-TVL weight against the TVL of any 1 voting period, since inception of the pool’s gauge.

If the Frax Gatekeepers feel the proposed amount is unreasonable given the data shown in this iteration of the proposal, then I will leave it up to them to decide what they believe is fair, just please make the proper adjustment in the snapshot version of the vote.

I encourage any interested party to run the numbers themselves to verify I did not error, and to voice their opinion, especially if in opposition.

EDIT#1 Per the recommendation of Sir Sam Kazemian, I have edited the figures to include the average(AVG.) price of FXS at the time of rewards-emitted for all voting periods to date. The AVG is calculated using 3 data points: First-Voting-Date, Last-Voting-Date/First-APR-date and Last-APR-Date. Using the AVG price of FXS per period, I will then include both the total, and the weight-adjusted # as before.

EDIT#2 After further discussion with Sam K (thank you sir), It was pointed out that I made one grave error in my initial calculations; my original equations did not account for the Time-Lock Boost Multiplier of Emissions per capita. The calculations below now account for this.

Sam proposed a 3x across the board on all previous “Liable Debt” calculations, for simplicities sake. I ran into a problem while performing that operation however, in that once we get to more recent figures, the 3x results in an over calculation. To combat this, I decided to use a “Virtual Weight” for the figures, which allowed me to apply the 3x while still retaining the relative weight per pool, per period, to determine the value of rewards owed. The virtual weight calculations account for the 3x boost to APR through TVL rather than directly to APR, the same way the gauges do. This was a much more workable method of achieving the desired outcome of accounting for the 3x boost on locked TVL and how it affected rewards and thereby the Debt Liability in this proposal.

I started with a MAX LOCK(3.0x) and utilized a linear decay (-0.013 every 7 days) for the boost calculations. (Additionally, I found a single figure where I incorrectly calculated the average price of FXS for a single period and have since corrected that.)

Total $value$ upon emission of ALL rewards = $576,460.9796 = 23.2% (fee)

Total USD of all FXS rewards emitted to 2.484m LP valued at time of emission, using Max Boost of 3.0 with linear decay : $208,481.0176

208,481.0176 / 2,484,000 = 8.39%

I propose the 2.484m TVL within the StakeDAO sdETH-FraxPut Pool be unlocked for a withdrawal fee equal to the USD-Value-at-time-of-Emission of ALL FXS rewarded to the (2.484m) LP in this pool (8.39% of 2.484m TVL) (+ slippage ~1.57%) = 10% FEE

Vote

• For: Implement the ragequit function for the StakeDAO sdETH-FraxPut gauge (10% fee)
• Against: Do nothing.