Authors Community Members: Brazy and Justin Bram
Summary Provide extra incentive to vote-lock FXS.
Abstract If adopted, this proposal seeks to:
Redirect 50% of AMO profits to buyback and distribute FXS to veFXS holders.
Currently, 100% of AMO profits are going to FXS-1559 to buyback and burn FXS. Instead, we propose to redirect 50% of AMO profits to buyback and distribute FXS to veFXS holders.
Motivation This proposal is motivated by lack of incentive for people to vote-lock their FXS. By adding these rewards, community members will be incentivized to participate in protocol governance.
veFXS follows the Curve Finance vote-lock model. veCRV holders currently receive 50% of trading fees from the protocol. At this time, partially due to these incentives, about 50% of CRV supply is vote-locked into veCRV for an average of 3.65 years. We propose to follow a similar reward structure, and hopefully see similar success for the Frax protocol.