There are currently ~900 million GEAR in circulation. At the same time, ~100 million GEAR are locked in Curve LP (you can see exact amount here). Many of those who provide liquidity in Curve have participated in cidered liquidity and are active members of the community. Therefore, it seems fair to give them also the right to participate in the Governance.
GEAR balance on curve * balanceOfLP(holder) / totalLPSupply()
, whereGEAR balance on curve shows how much GEAR are on LP pool contract (0x0e9b5b092cad6f1c5e6bc7f89ffe1abb5c95f1c2)This proposal is to allow governance to function and reach quorums, which have always been hard to achieve - but now almost impossible. As such, while governance remains in the snapshot<>multisig model, some decisions value speed over fine print. Therefore, in case snapshot governance gets attacked due to Curve pool manipulation [this proposal done doesn’t allow for dummy manipulations, but it wasn’t fully audited either] - snapshot admins reserve the right to make a post-mortem and make the attacker proposal void. That is per the rules described in the docs (which have remained unchanged since before the DAO inception https://docs.gearbox.finance/governance/setup#practical-point-with-regard-to-the-snapshot). Later on, once governance becomes fully on-chain, any such oversight actions would not be possible or technically feasible. But that’s a question to solve in the next steps. For now, the model improvement suggested should do its job and allow for swift transition.
I propose to add voting power for Curve LP holders according to the logic described above