Yesterday Gearbox launched leveraged restaking and has already filled the 2500 ETH cap. Due to the strong demand from the user side, it seems reasonable to further expand leveraged restaking offers further. This proposal aims to achieve that, by offering an increase in limits, adding new LRT assets, and removing the Degen NFT requirement for access.
Note: This proposal is urgent. After reaching the quorum with majority voting to approve, the technical multisig will queue the required transaction immediately (before the voting ends). Timelock ETA will be set up to 4 hours after the end of voting.
Should the proposal be rejected after transactions are set up, the veto multisig will cancel all transactions they mature.
| Asset | Quota increase fee | Min quota rate | Max quota rate | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ezETH | 0% | 0.05% | 30% | 15,000 WETH |
| weETH | 0% | 0.05% | 30% | 15,000 WETH |
A new dedicated Credit Manager will be created specifically for LRT assets. This manager doesn’t require any access control (DegenNFT), because LRT assets are liquid ERC-20 tokens that are traded on dexes and have deep liquidity there. The new Credit Manager will also have a slightly lower liquidation premium, to allow for higher LTs and leverage.
| Token | LTV | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| ezETH | 91.5% | |
| weETH | 91.5% | |
| rETH | 0 | Used for routing, can’t be used as collateral |
| rETH-f | 0 | Curve LP token, added for compatibility, can’t be used as collateral |
The following is the list of contracts for which adapters are connected to the CM:
GIP-91 introduced Timelock Policies, allowing quota limit increases by 30% and credit manager debt limit increases by 70% per month without additional voting. However, due to high demand, the delay in changing the limits leads to degradation of UX. So it is proposed to allow the ControllerTimelock’s RISK_ROLE (the technical multisig) to change values freely within the caps stated above (i.e. to any value up to 15000 WETH for weETH/ezETH and 30000 WETH for credit manager borrowing limit) without additional governance voting.
In practice this means that the following policies will be set:
Sets the max debt per Credit Account.
| admin | RISK_ROLE |
|---|---|
| delay | 12 hours |
| exactValue | Not restricted |
| minValue | Not restricted |
| maxValue | Not restricted |
| updatePeriod | Not restricted |
| minPctChangeDown | Not restricted |
| minPctChangeUp | Not restricted |
| maxPctChangeDown | Not restricted |
| maxPctChangeUp | Not restricted |
| minChange | Not restricted |
| maxChange | Not restricted |
Sets a new quota limit for a token.
| admin | RISK_ROLE |
|---|---|
| delay | 12 hours |
| exactValue | Not restricted |
| minValue | Not restricted |
| maxValue | Not restricted |
| updatePeriod | Not restricted |
| minPctChangeDown | Not restricted |
| minPctChangeUp | Not restricted |
| maxPctChangeDown | Not restricted |
| maxPctChangeUp | Not restricted |
| minChange | Not restricted |
| maxChange | Not restricted |
Note that RISK_ROLE is currently the main technical multisig, so this does not increase governance risk, but allows the multisig to update caps under a shorter delay.
We see (check here) high utilization of USDC and WETH pools while the utilization of WBTC pool is less than 10%. In this regard, it is proposed to remove LM rewards from WBTC pool.
* This is the maximal quota limit per asset / credit manager debt limit. The timelock controller can set the cap to any value at or below this maximum with a 12 hour delay.
** Note that this Credit Manager will not have an expirable Credit Facade connected initially, but these fees need to be set regardless.
Simple Approve/Reject voting