Hello all!
This is not a binding vote. It's just a temperature check vote to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn't require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.
Please read the proposal below to understand the proposed program process, general rules, and specific parameters. All specific [values] are just a indicative example at this stage and will be decided and put for a binding vote later, but only if this vote has a favourable result.
Thank you for voting!
Non-Constitutional
A new version of the Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program, that allows to reward both voters and contributors to the Arbitrum DAO in a predictable, easy to understand, objective, and meritocratic way.
This program was designed with the goals of:
However, delegates will only get rewards if they qualify for them, according to the following process:
All parameters and amounts inside [square brackets] are just rough examples at this point, that should be decided by the DAO, as part of this collaborative process of designing the next version of the Delegate Incentive Program for Arbitrum DAO. Additionally, all other terms in bold in the diagram above, will be explained below.
A healthy Delegate Incentive Program is a requirement in any mature DAO that has actual onchain governance, and Arbitrum DAO is probably at a point where it cannot sustain itself without a program of this sort. The recent issues in achieving quorum on proposals, and the lack of organic, community driven initiatives and proposals since the introduction of the new vision in April, show that Arbitrum DAO clearly needs a program that incentivizes delegates adequately. This program should be designed to incentivize our community to show up, vote, and contribute to the DAO to the best of their abilities, and to attract new and talented members to our community.
Given how the past versions of the program evolved, and the feedback it generated, it is clear that the new delegate incentive program needs to be way more predictable, objective, efficient, and attractive.
I’m now sharing here on the forum this proposal for a new delegate incentive program with the intent to kick-start a public and open discussion and deliberation process about it. The goal is to have a new, more adequate version of the program in effect from November 2025 onwards. More importantly, to have a version of the program that is designed and shaped in the open, by the biggest and most diverse body of stakeholders possible.
EDIT: Curia joined in on the program design, to contribute with the reward mechanism for the Second Dip and eventualy operationalize a live dashboard with the program results, given their relevant experience in other ecosystems.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, is focused on incentivizing 3 main outcomes:
These 3 main outcomes shaped the format, rules, and characteristics of this proposed Delegate Incentive Program and improve on the previous versions of this program, namely DIP 1.5, DIP 1.6, and the currently active DIP 1.7.
It also keeps certain characteristics of the previous versions of the Delegate Incentive Program, like the public Delegate Application Process and adherence to the Community Values in the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the Community Guidelines, and the DAO Code of Conduct.
This version of the Delegate Incentive Program, the Arbitrum Triple Dip, has the following rules, that we welcome all delegate feedback on, as presented in the illustrated process above:
If in a given month, any offchain or onchain vote does have meaningful participation, aka, does not have more total casted voting power than the respective non-constitutional or constitutional quorum in effect at the time, nobody gets rewards, that month. (Except for “socially cancelled” onchain proposals)
If in a given month, delegates don’t vote on at least [100%] of offchain votes and on at least [100%] onchain votes, they don’t get rewards, that month.
If in a given month, delegates don’t have more than [500,000] ARB in average voting power, they don’t qualify for First Dip rewards, that month.
First Dip rewards are fixed at [30,000] ARB per month, and fully distributed, proportionally, to the delegates that comply to the criteria 3 and 4 above. a. For each delegate, the average of the casted voting power in all offchain and onchain votes in a given month, is used to compute the share of the First Dip rewards they receive. For example, if there are only 2 qualifying delegates, one with the higher voting power average of 9,000,000 ARB, and another one with the lower voting power average of 1,000,000 ARB, the first one receives 90% of the available First Dip amount, and the second one receives 10% of the available First Dip amount.
If in a given month, delegates don’t have more than [50,000] ARB in average voting power, they don’t qualify for Second Dip rewards, that month.
Each month, delegates should participate on the forum by commenting and ‘Liking’ others’ valuable posts. Contributions are measured by the Peer Recognition Score (PRS), which is designed to reward quality over quantity. a. Instead of scoring the comments themselves, the PRS is based entirely on the ‘Likes’ your comments receive from your peers which weights based on your reputation or voting power. At the end of each month, the system will calculate the score by looking at all the ‘Likes’ received, which are then normalized across the different threads in the forum. This means that accumulating a high volume of comments won’t improve your score; the goal is to make contributions that others find valuable enough to ‘Like’. For a full breakdown of the methodology, which is still being refined, please see the draft document here.
Second Dip rewards are fixed at [30,000] ARB per month, and fully distributed, proportionally to their Peer Review Score, to the de
... please visit link below to view full proposal
https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xb9e775ba4f1fa8cdc8e45c342428c3dabff7f19ce7b8cc4bde7cc6c8e542d963