Given the sunset resolution did not pass, the DAO must create a path for dissatisfied $CITIZENs to permanently exit and claim a pro-rata share of the treasury. Since there are many tokens in the Kong Land ecosystem, and there exist some vulnerabilities to the ragequit process when the cost of token acquisition is less than a pro-rata share of the treasury, we have determined that only eligible Citizens holding $CITIZEN ERC-721 tokens may ragequit. Such tokens are hereafter referred to as an “Eligible Token.”
The general structure of the ragequit function will follow the Molochv3 contract standard, and the Senate will facilitate making all remaining ETH and subsequent liquid assets available for the ragequit. The implementation is expected to include:
This vote will establish whether or not current holders of the $CITIZEN ERC-20 may continue to convert their holdings into an Eligible Token:
tokenId <= 281 || (1000 <= tokenId && tokenId <= 1011))In both cases: The treasury assets available for claim via ragequit includes all $ETH and subsequent liquid assets as determined by the Senate. The temporary freeze on $CTZN → $CITIZEN burns will be made permanent.
Since the inception of KONG Land the ERC-20 $CITIZEN served as the primary path to join the DAO. It predates the ERC-721, the formal establishment of the UNA and the creation of the treasury. $CITIZEN ERC-20s have historically been welcome to participate in the DAO conversation through the closed “# citizen” channel in Discord. And, at the beginning of this year, the DAO supplied liquidity to rebalance the market so that it is now affordable to join the DAO through the ERC-20 path.
Shutting this path down permanently is shortsighted. I believe that creating a 1 year period where only existing ERC-721 $CITIZENs receive a portion of the treasury is a fair way to allow more involved $CITIZENs the ability to exit without cutting off an important means of immigration into KONG Land. Permanently blocking a set of possible $CITIZEN shares would set a poor precedent where one group of $CITIZENs may profit over others.
One year provides ample time for “active” $CITIZENs (or at least more active) to claim a larger share of the treasury if they wish to ragequit while allowing ERC-20 $CITIZENs a path to fully naturalize after one year at which point any active $CITIZEN ERC-721 (regardless of when they burned) can claim a share upon ragequit.
There is one other important net effect from this: as we know that all ERC-20s will never burn into the ERC-721 and ragequit, there will be a larger buffer of capital available to the treasury (after one year) to pursue the refined KONG Land mission.
As ERC-721 $CITIZENs are the only ones who can vote in this snapshot their is a significant risk of the tyranny of the majority; we can easily override those who are still allowed in $CITIZEN spaces but do not have a voice in this vote. I don’t believe that’s the right thing to do.
The token ecosystem of Kong Land is too complicated for new members to understand. Between $CITIZEN-20, $CTZN, $CITIZEN-721, $KONG, $LAND, and $RERRO, we have proliferated too many tokens to be legible to unfamiliar prospective members. While Alpha Citizen NFTs have historical value and intrigue, the continued use of various tokens to represent convertible shares of the NFT, and the resulting NFT as a necessary but not sufficient condition of voting, is abstruse and confusing.
There is little to no market for the NFTs, with a lifetime volume of less than 9 ETH, and the $CITIZEN ERC-20 tokens themselves have suffered illiquid markets for years with the Senate contributing significant resources to correct the LPs. Members have only successfully recruited 11 new voting members with $CTZN, and the value of using such tokens instead of simpler alternatives remains to be seen.
Rather than re-enabling claims on a defunct token, it would be better to lock the original token holders to represent a historical easter egg, and to focus on simplifying the ecosystem to merely LAND, or some other less complicated mark of voting membership.
While this vote is subject to a tyranny of the majority, the non-voting members have had more than three years to claim an ERC-721 token and sign the charter, securing a vote for themselves. They have elected not to do this and have chosen to speculate on the alternative tokens instead. They never converted to a voter, and never used the tokens to recruit more people to the DAO. They merely created a liquidity crunch and made citizenship harder to get for new members.