Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.
As the leader of the team that is currently most impacted by the length of time required in the voting process, and a DAO member who will likely be making a lot of proposals, I have a vested interest in the process being structured in a way that allows the DAO to execute changes as quickly as possible.
The Lunar DAO is in charge of the vision and direction of the Lunar Platform. The LIPP v1 process appears to have originated from the Apecoin Governance model. While building our process off of an existing DAO with more resources sounds great in theory, in practice their model is incredibly rigid and will significantly slow down important decisions. This proposal innovates on existing governance models to create more flexibility while still allowing the community to be involved in and drive decisions.
The majority of the LIP Protocol was borrowed from the Apecoin DAO Governance documents, without the drafting attorney advising the Lunar Foundation about their impact on restarting development of the platform or future initiatives. The Lunar Foundation was not given the proper opportunity to make changes to the proposed process before they were put up for adoption, and as a result are forced to implement a process that is unnecessarily narrow and rigid.
Having spent significant time working to draft the proposals that are currently up for a vote, the Lunar Foundation has found it to be lacking in several critical areas:
It’s clunky. The LIP Protocol documents outline the process in a way that is unnecessarily complicated and doesn’t help guide the reader through the process in a way that is easily understood.
For example, there are two primary categories of proposals, each with multiple subtypes and tagging requirements. Further, the “Procedural LIPs” section contains several logical errors that excludes situations instead of including them, leaving a number of permutations without proper coverage.
It’s too narrow. Even though the LIP Protocol specifies multiple types of proposals, it forces all of those proposals through a single voting process and timeline. There is no concept of a high-priority queue, which creates significant and unnecessary delays if proposals are not submitted by a specific time.
It’s too rigid. Apecoin is the only DAO we reviewed that could only vote on proposals on a specific day of the week. While that may have worked for them, we intend to move significantly faster.
It doesn’t handle emergencies. There is no delegated authority for the Lunar Foundation to bypass the standard proposal processes as necessary specifically to deal with real-time emergencies that threaten the Lunar ecosystem.
Hypothetically speaking, if there was a bug in the contract that leaks LNR under certain scenarios, it could take up to 14 days to debate and execute a proposal to pause the contract to stop the leakage. That is simply unacceptable.
It’s not innovative. Lunar has never just aped what some other group has done. We leave our mark on the industry and aim to leave it better than when we found it.
In trying to create a process that works best for this team, I have put together a detailed breakdown of other DAOs and their governance timelines. You can find that breakdown here.
Based on the reviewed DAO documentation, the minimum time for any organization to make a change is 7 days. There are cases where that will not be fast enough for Lunar DAO to execute effectively. The model proposed allows for flexibility while retaining the importance of an internal diligence process.
Author’s Note: The updated rules are still being discussed by the Foundation and will be posted for discussion as a subsequent comment.