TL; DR

The proposal aims to further optimize the governance rights of LXDAO: Community members holding Buidler Cards must make an additional declaration in order to participate in governance voting or initiate proposals, which will be valid for each quarter. This measure is intended to reduce the governance weight of inactive members, enhance the efficiency of community governance, and increase overall community engagement.

Background

In the current governance framework of LXDAO, Buidler Card holders automatically receive permanent governance tokens. As the number of holders increases, the issue of governance apathy gradually leads to the declining weight of actively participating community contributors in governance decisions.

Currently, there are 91 members with voting rights, while the number of participants in voting governance each quarter is around 16 to 20.

LXDAO has implemented LIP47 to lower the required votes for proposals to pass and to increase the weight of opposing votes, while also considering abstentions as a form of opposition. This not only enhances the governance efficiency of the community but also ensures that dissenting opinions are adequately addressed.

However, lowering the voting threshold can easily invite governance attacks, and as the number of community members increases, the voting threshold will need to be continually adjusted. This clearly serves only as a short-term solution to governance efficiency issues.

This proposal aims to solve the problem of governance apathy in the long term by dynamically adjusting governance weights every quarter through the activation of governance rights.

Specific Implementation

Existing Scheme:

According to the LIP47 governance improvement proposal: https://snapshot.org/#/lxdao.eth/proposal/0xc385e59f53167ff795f6b741accb74e54590c0cc7a6a19b7794e519466206ad7

• Community members holding Buidler Cards will automatically activate permanent governance rights and can participate in community voting and proposals at any time.
• Voting will use a dynamic threshold calculation, with the base being the total number of Buidler Cards held.
• For ordinary proposals, the minimum absolute number of favorable votes ≥ 10% for approval.
• For consensus-level proposals, the minimum absolute number of favorable votes ≥ 40% for approval.

(Absolute favorable votes = Favorable votes - 2 × Opposition votes - Abstention votes. For example, with 30 votes in favor, 20 against, and 2 abstentions, absolute favorable votes = -12.)

Modified Scheme:

Voting Rights Scheme

• Governance rights will require secondary activation: Members holding Buidler Cards must apply for governance rights each quarter.
• Voting will continue to use dynamic thresholds calculated based on the total number of Buidler Card holders applying for governance rights that quarter.
• For ordinary proposals, the absolute favorable votes ≥ 20% will be required for approval (returning to LIP0).
• For consensus-level proposals, the absolute favorable votes ≥ 70% will be required for approval (returning to LIP0).

(To fully respect dissenting opinions, the 2x counting rule for opposition votes will continue to apply.)

Implementation Process

• In the first week of each quarter, a post will be created in the forum for governance rights applications.
• Buidler Card holders can respond to the application post anytime.
• The governance team will add applicants to the whitelist as soon as their application is received.
• Each quarter’s governance token will be independent and not reused.

Differentiation Between Ordinary and Consensus Proposals

Past considerations focused on the scope involved, whether it is unconstitutional, and whether it involves significant funding.

We hope to return the judgment to the community, namely:

• Provide guidelines for distinguishing between ordinary and consensus proposals in the forum/docs.
• Proposal initiators will indicate whether it is an ordinary or consensus proposal, and members who disagree with the proposal level may vote against it and request the initiator to adjust the level.

Governance Incentive Scheme

We will design a governance incentive pool, using LXP as rewards. Members participating in all voting for the quarter will share the total rewards equally.

The total amount of the incentive pool will be calculated as: total number of community proposals for the quarter * 100.

(Currently, LXDAO has an average of 7 proposals per quarter.)

Budget

The primary budget will be allocated for the governance incentive pool, estimating approximately 700 LXP per quarter based on an average of 7 proposals.

Key Results

The goal of this proposal is to improve governance efficiency, provide better voting and proposal incentive mechanisms for LXDAO, increase member engagement, and optimize organizational operational efficiency.

Through this proposal, we aim for active governance votes to exceed 80% each quarter.

概要

此提案旨在进一步优化 LXDAO 的治理权：社区 Buidler Card 持有者如需参与治理投票或发起提案需进行额外申明，该申明季度有效；此举旨在降低不活跃成员的治理比重，推动社区的治理效率同时增加社区的治理活跃度。

背景

当前 LXDAO 的治理框架中，Buidler Card 持有者自动获得永久治理通证，随着人数的增加后，治理冷漠的问题逐渐导致当下积极参与社区贡献群体的治理权重下降。

目前已累积91位成员具备投票资格，每季度参与投票治理的人数大约在16~20人之间。

LXDAO 通过 LIP47 即降低提案通过需要取得的票数，增加反对票的比重，同时将弃权票也纳入反对票性的一种。这既提高了社区的治理效率，同时也将社区的反对意见尽可能考虑充分。

但降低投票阈值容易引起治理攻击，同时随着社区成员的增加，投票阈值需要不断调整，这显然只是一个解决短期治理效率的提案。

本次提案意图长期解决治理冷漠的问题，通过治理权的季度激活，来动态的调整每个季度的治理权重。

具体实施

现有方案：

根据 LIP47 治理权改善提案：https://snapshot.org/#/lxdao.eth/proposal/0xc385e59f53167ff795f6b741accb74e54590c0cc7a6a19b7794e519466206ad7

• 拥有 Builder card 的社区成员将自动活动永久的治理权，可随时参与社区投票及提案
• 计票采取动态阈值的方式，阈值计算基数=Buidler Card 持有总数
• 普通级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 10% 即为通过
• 共识级提案最低绝对赞成票数 ≥ 40% 即为通过

（绝对赞成票 = 赞成票 - 反对票X2 - 弃权票。例如：30 票赞成，20 票反对，2弃权，绝对赞成票 = -12 票）

修改后方案：

投票权方案

• 治理权二次激活：持有 Buidler Card 的成员如需参与治理，需每个季度申请该季度的治理权
• 计票仍采取动态阈值的方式，阈值计算基数=当季度 Buidler Card 成员申请治理权总数
• 普通级提案绝对赞成票数 ≥ 20% 即为通过（回到 LIP0）
• 共识级提案绝对赞成票数 ≥ 70% 即为通过（回到 LIP0）

（为了充分尊重反对意见，反对票*2 的计票规则沿用）

实施流程

• 每个季度第一周在论坛开设治理权声明帖子
• Builder card 持有者可以随时在声明贴回复
• 治理组将在接收到申明的第一时间添加白名单
• 每季通证为独立通证，不重复使用

关于普通提案以及共识提案区分

过去主要考虑涉及范围、是否违宪以及是否涉及较大金额资金

我们希望将判断交还给社区，即：

• 在论坛/Docs 提供对普通提案或共识提案判断的引导。
• 提案人在提案中标明是普通提案或共识提案，成员若不同意提案等级，可投否决票，要求提案人重新调整提案等级。

治理激励方案

我们将设计治理激励池，激励采用 LXP，参与季度全部投票的成员将共同平分

激励池总额为=社区当季度提案数量*100

（目前 LXDAO 平均季度提案数量为 7个）

预算

主要为治理激励奖金池，按照每季度平均 7个 提案，预计每季度涉及预算为 700 LXP上下浮动。

关键结果

该提案的目标是提高治理效率，为LXDAO提供更好的投票与提案激励机制，提高成员活跃度，优化组织运作效率，为更多治理措施的提升提供基础。

通过此次提案，我们希望每个季度活跃的治理票数能够达到 80% 以上。