Author: Stake DAO Association
This proposal aims to migrate Stake DAO’s governance and staking system from the current veSDT (vote-escrowed SDT) model to the new vlSDT (vote-locked SDT) model. This evolution will improve user experience, increase governance participation, and lower the barriers to entry inside the Stake DAO ecosystem.
This proposal is presented for governance and technical purposes only and does not constitute an offer of securities, financial instruments, or regulated services under applicable European Union, Swiss, or international financial regulations, including Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (“MiCA”).
The implementation of vlSDT does not create any entitlement to profits, dividends, or guaranteed returns and does not constitute investment advice, financial promotion, or solicitation.
Participation in staking, governance, or migration mechanisms is voluntary and undertaken at the sole risk of users.
The veSDT model, inspired by Curve Finance, has several constraints:
Linear Voting Power Decay: voting power continuously decreases over time, forcing users to re-lock regularly to maintain their influence. It is very frustrating, as a user who committed for 4 years with the protocol, to see their voting power progressively decay.
Management Complexity: users must actively manage their positions to optimize their voting power and boost. They are incentivised not to claim any rewards to avoid updating their boost at the theoretical rate, which introduces unwanted “cheating” behaviours (users can benefit from their max boost without relocking as long as they do not interact with the gauge contracts).
Barriers to entry: locking for up to 4 years represents a significant commitment that may discourage new participants.
Boost selling constraints: the linear decay of veSDT leads to unnecessary complexity when selling veSDT boost to sdTKN users willing to increase their governance impact.
The vlSDT system brings the following improvements:
Non-decaying voting power: 1 SDT locked gives 1 voting power.
Soft lock framework: Rather than a hard lock for 4 years, suffering from a painful delay de facto reducing the use of the token by half on average over the 4 years, a vlSDT user who wants to exit can still do it after a medium term cooldown period. Furthermore, a user who wants to be able to immediately exit can still do it, paying a penalty to other vlSDT holders.
Cycle proof: thanks to its medium term cooldown period, SDT should still be fairly immune to quick price actions as holders of vlSDT will not be able to instantly sell when the price moves, unless they are willing to pay a penalty.
Desynchronised unlocks: unlike the classic vlTKN model, this one does not have fixed periods, avoiding massive unlock events and the corresponding price action and speculation.
Simplification of SDT use: with the fixed amount of vlSDT per SDT locked, everything is simpler, especially boost selling.
Core Principle: Stake SDT → Get equal voting power (1:1)
Staking Mechanism:
Unstaking Flow:
Unstaking Rules:
Staking While Unstaking:
New stakes are independent of pending requests and do not cancel or modify them.
Example:
Initial: 100 staked, 0 pending → Voting Power = 100 Request unstake 40 → Voting Power = 60 Stake 50 more → 150 staked, 40 pending → Voting Power = 110
Early unstaking:
Users can request an immediate unstaking. They would receive their SDT immediately, after paying an instant-unstaking penalty which linearly decays over the unstaking period from [25]% to 0%. The unstaking penalty starting fee can be adjusted by governance, allowing for flexibility.
Rewards:
Balance Checkpointing: vlSDT checkpoints user balances and total supply on every balance change:
These checkpoints allow FeeDistributor to read balances at week boundaries without decay math.
Protocol Change Management: Any material modification to staking parameters, cooldown periods, penalty rates, or migration logic shall require:
(i) Public disclosure (ii) Minimum governance voting period of 7 days (iii) Independent technical review (iv) Multisignature execution
Emergency changes shall be subject to ex-post community ratification.
Non-Custodial Architecture: The vlSDT infrastructure operates on a non-custodial basis. Users retain full control of their private keys and transaction initiation. Neither the Association nor any affiliated entity has unilateral access to user funds.
User-Initiated Migration:
Key Migration Rules:
Migration ignores remaining lock time — users get full voting power immediately
Only the veSDT contract can call the migration credit function on vlSDT
Governance may initiate forced migration solely in exceptional circumstances, subject to:
Governance can migrate users who are unable to migrate themselves on their demand
Migration Safeguards
Existing boost delegated
| Contract | Address | Role |
|---|---|---|
| SDT | 0x73968b9a57c6E53d41345FD57a6E6ae27d6CDB2F | Token being staked |
| veSDT | 0x0C30476f66034E11782938DF8e4384970B6c9e8a | Authorized to call migration function |
| BoostRegistry | TBD (new) | Reports delegated out amounts for unstake checks |
| Feature | veSDT (current) | vlSDT (proposed) |
|---|---|---|
| Voting Power | Decays linearly over time | Flat 1:1 (no decay) |
| Lock Duration | Up to 4 years | No lock (8-week exit queue) |
| Exit Mechanism | Wait for lock expiry | Request + 8-week delay |
| Boost on sdTokens voting power | Up to 2.5x | Up to 2.5x |
| Fee Distribution | Based on decaying balance | Based on checkpointed balance |
| Delegation | Decaying and limited to the lock duration. Users receiving the boost had to not perform any action with the gauge to avoid suffering from the decay. | Full integration with BoostRegistry. Non-decaying, limited to a maximum of one year, blocking exit requests for the delegated amount |
| Re-locking | Required to maintain power | Not needed |
Transparency & Reporting
The Association shall publish as part of its monthly reports:
All reports shall be publicly accessible.
Market Integrity & Abuse Prevention
Stake DAO prohibits manipulation, insider trading, wash trading, or abusive governance practices.
Governance participants are expected to comply with applicable market abuse regulations.
Suspected misconduct may result in public disclosure and governance sanctions.
Contributors, developers, governance participants, and Association officers may hold SDT, vlSDT, or related positions. Such holdings may influence voting behavior.
No fiduciary duty is owed by token holders to other participants.
Users will acknowledge and accept that participation in the vlSDT system entails technological, market, governance, and regulatory risks, including but not limited to:
Smart contract vulnerabilities
Governance capture or manipulation
Liquidity and exit constraints
Regulatory changes impacting crypto-assets
Economic model failure
The Association does not guarantee the security, profitability, or continued operation of the vlSDT system.
This proposal is submitted pursuant to the Stake DAO governance framework and the Articles of Association of the Stake DAO Association (Zug, Switzerland).
The Association acts as a coordinating and administrative entity and does not exercise discretionary control over user assets.
All material protocol changes require on-chain approval and, where applicable, multisignature execution by authorized governance signers.
The protocol does not collect, store, or process personal data within the meaning of GDPR or Swiss FADP. All interactions occur via public blockchain addresses. Any off-chain interfaces operated by third parties remain subject to their own privacy policies.
To the maximum extent permitted by law, the Association, contributors, and governance participants shall not be liable for any direct or indirect losses arising from participation in the vlSDT system.
For (Yes): Approve the migration from veSDT to vlSDT according to the specifications described. Against (No): Reject the proposal and maintain the current veSDT system. Abstain: Take no position on this proposal.
This proposal follows the Stake DAO Proposal Framework.